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The Significant Association Between
Punitive and Compensatory
Damages in Blockbuster Cases:
A Methodological Primer
Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells*
This article assesses the relation between punitive and compensatory
damages in a data set, gathered by Hersch and Viscusi (H-V), consisting of
all known punitive damages awards in excess of $100 million from 1985
through 2003. It shows that a strong, statistically significant relation exists
between punitive and compensatory awards, a relation that replicates
similar findings in nearly all other analyses of punitive and compensatory
damages. H-V’s claim that no significant relation exists between punitive
and compensatory awards in these data appears to be an artifact of ques-
tionable regression methodology.
This article focuses on methodological issues in assessing the pattern of large
punitive awards and other skewed data sets. Large punitive awards are one of
the least explored empirical frontiers for punitive damages researchers.
Multiple studies involving different, comprehensive data sets have yielded
consistent results for several issues. Punitive awards were claimed to be
frequent and increasing dramatically in number. Yet virtually all empirical
research finds them to be only rarely awarded,1 to be most frequently
*Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall,
Ithaca, NY 14853; email: theodore-eisenberg@postoffice.law.cornell.edu. Wells is Professor of
Statistics, Department of Social Statistics, Cornell University, Professor of Clinical Epidemiology,
Cornell University Weill Medical College, and Elected Member of the Law Faculty, Cornell
University.
1For example, Thomas A. Eaton, David B. Mustard & Susette M. Talarico, The Effects of Seeking
Punitive Damages on the Processing of Tort Claims, 34 J. Legal Stud. 343 (2005); Thomas A.
Eaton, Susette M. Talarico & Richard E. Dunn, Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical Look
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awarded in cases where intentional misbehavior likely occurred,2 and not to
be increasing over time.3 Another punitive damages theme had juries pulling
numbers out of the air in picking punitive awards.4 Yet no evidence support-
ing such systematic occurrences in real cases has been presented. To the
contrary, the mass of cases reveal strong statistically significant relationships
between compensatory and punitive awards.5 Extreme anecdotes about a
punitive damages system out of control are regularly offered; but few with-
stand scrutiny by professional researchers. The poster-child case for punitive
damages reform—the McDonald’s coffee-spill case—turns out hardly to be
the stuff on which to base massive tort reform.6
at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1049, 1094 (2000); Theodore Eisenberg,
Neil LaFountain, Brain Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 745 (2002) [hereinafter “Juries and
Judges”]; Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells,
The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623, 633–37 (1997) (summarizing
studies) [hereinafter “Predictability”]; Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries
in Florida: In Terrorem and in Reality, 38 Harv. J. Legis. 487, 487 (2001).
2Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 1; Erik Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts Since
1985 (1996).
3Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Michael Heise, Neil LaFountain, G. Thomas
Munsterman, Brian Ostrom & Martin T. Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical
Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. (2006) (forthcoming).
4“Legislation is needed because punitive damages are wildly unpredictable, so arbitrary as to be
unfair and are awarded without any guidance to juries, which simply pick numbers out of the
air.” Editorial, Trial Lawyers’ Triumph, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1996, 1996 WL 3069750.
5For example, Eisenberg et al., Juries and Judges, supra note 1, at 773–74; Eisenberg et al.,
Predictability, supra note 1; Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555,
1605–05 & n.136 (2003); Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration
of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1–43 (2006).
6Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18,
1994). The jury awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages for severe burns suffered by the
plaintiff and $2,700,000 in punitive damages. The trial judge reduced the punitive award to
$480,000. The case was ultimately settled, presumably for a lesser amount still. For discussion of
this case, see, e.g., William Haltom & Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and
the Litigation Crisis 183–226 (2004); Theodore Eisenberg, Use It or Pretenders Will Abuse It:
The Importance of Archival Legal Information, 74 UMKC L. Rev. (forthcoming); Samuel R.
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 (1996); Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross & Mary Rose, Jury Awards for Medical
Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of the Awards, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 265, 266 (1998);
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With horror stories about punitive damages’ high frequency and lack
of relation to compensatory awards discredited, one of the last empirical
frontiers is large punitive awards. It no longer is the mass of punitive awards
that is said to be so troublesome. Rather, it is the relative handful of extreme
awards. A recently available data set enables systematic exploration of large
punitive awards. Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi (H-V) gathered data on the
largest punitive damages awards, those in excess of $100 million.7 Their
analysis claims that these “blockbuster” punitive damages awards bear no
relation to compensatory awards. We explore the pattern of large awards
using the H-V data. Traditional statistical methods, applied somewhat more
rigorously than H-V apply them, reveal a reasonably strong association
between punitive and compensatory damages. Analysis of the H-V data
set also serves as a reminder that regression models are best employed after
inspecting the data, and best relied on when assumptions concerning the
models have been checked. The ease of modern computing and the impres-
sive power of regression methodology may result in an understandable
tendency to regress without sufficient attention to important details. This
risks yielding both spurious results and having nontechnical scholars naively
rely on reported results.8
I. The Hersch-Viscusi Data
H-V analyze the relation between punitive and compensatory awards in 63
tried cases decided from January 1985 to June 2003. The cases were collected
using “a detailed search to identify all cases for which there were punitive
damages of at least $100 million.”9 During the same time period, H-V found
three bench trials resulting in a punitive damages award in excess of $100
million. Contrary to findings in several other data sets, H-V report no mean-
Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided that a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9
Million, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1.
7Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (2004).
8A recent instance of too hasty reliance on regression results may be regression-based assertions
that the death penalty deters homicides. See Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and
General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 303 (2005).
9Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 4–5.
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ingful relation between punitive awards and compensatory awards in the
same case. “Analysis of these very large awards indicates that they bear no
statistical relation to the compensatory awards.”10 More rigorous analyses
than H-V’s initial pass at the data suggest that this conclusion is questionable.
Traditional regression tools suggest that the relation between punitive and
compensatory awards in large cases is stronger than that reported by H-V.
II. The Relation Between Punitive
and Compensatory Awards
Understanding why H-V understate the relation between punitive and com-
pensatory awards requires reviewing basic principles of statistical analysis of
the relation between two continuous variables. Summary statistics of their
punitive and compensatory award jury trial data are in Table 1. The table
indicates that the data are skewed in the sense that the means of both the
compensatory and punitive awards are much greater than the medians. The
median punitive award is $200 million, whereas the mean punitive award
exceeds $3 billion. The median compensatory award is about $23 million
and the median compensatory award is about $200 million. The medians
and means are strikingly high but recall that this is a data set selected using
punitive awards of $100 million or more as the selection criteria, so strikingly
large summary statistics should not be surprising.
A. The Importance of Graphing the Data
These summary statistics raise the likelihood that the data are in some sense
extreme. It is helpful, as always, to graph the data to explore the relation
between punitive and compensatory awards. A scatterplot of the data is often
10Id. at 2.
Table 1: Mean and Median Compensatory Punitive Award (in Thousands)
Jury Trial Cases with Punitive Damages of at Least $100 Million, 1985–2003
Mean Median Minimum Maximum N
Compensatory award 217,317 23,318 170 7,530,000 60
Punitive award 3,506,958 200,000 100,000 144,871,400 60
Note: Data consist of 60 jury-tried cases with punitive awards of $100 million or more, from
1985–2003, as reported in Hersch and Viscusi, Journal of Legal Studies 2004.
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the first step in exploring the relation between two continuous variables.11
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of the compensatory and punitive data. To help put
the graphical pattern in Figure 1 in perspective, we report in Figure 2 a
second data set, often used in statistical discussions, consisting of the relation
between mammalian body weight and brain weight.
An introductory regression book’s discussion of the mammal data in
Figure 2 is instructive.
The initial attempt to graph brain weight (in grams) versus body weight (in
kilograms) . . . indicates immediately that some sort of transformation is
required. Most of the points in the plot are jammed into the lower left-hand
11For example, Sanford Weisberg, Applied Linear Regression 1 (3d ed. 2005) (“In regression
problems with one predictor and one response, the scatterplot of the response versus the
predictor is the starting point for regression analysis.”); Lawrence E. Hamilton, Regression with
Graphics 34 (1992) (scatterplots are basic tools in regression).
Figure 1: Punitive versus compensatory damages: punitive awards of at least
$100,000,000, 1985–2003.
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corner with only a few stragglers elsewhere. Because of the wide variation of both
variables, log transformations are obvious candidates.12
In this case, the obvious transformation candidate leads to highly satisfactory
results. Figure 3 shows the same data as Figure 2, but with each variable
transformed to logs. The existence of a strong, linear relation between brain
weight and body weight is clear. The analyst who relied on Figure 2 to
12Sanford Weisberg, Applied Linear Regression 130 (1980). In a later edition, Weisberg states:
Apart from the three separated points for two species of elephants and for humans, the
uneven distribution of points hides any useful visual information about the mean of
BrainWt, given BodyWt. In any case, there is little or no evidence for a straight-line mean
function here. Both variables range over several orders of magnitude from tiny species with
body weights of just a few grams to huge animals of over 6600 kg. Transformations can help
in this problem.
Weisberg, supra note 11, at 148.
Figure 2: Brain weight versus body weight, mammals.
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conclude that no significant relation exists between brain weight and body
weight would be in error.
Much the same can be said about the punitive and compensatory
damages data in Figure 1. Figure 1 is not helpful in exploring the relation
between punitive and compensatory awards. As in the case of the brain-body
weight data, most of the data points in the plot “are jammed into the lower
left-hand corner.” The graph “indicates immediately that some sort of trans-
formation is required.” Given the skewness suggested by Table 1, a standard
statistical technique is to transform the data into logarithms.13 H-V err in
13Weisberg, supra note 11, at 148–50; Hamilton, supra note 11, at 19–20. In fact, simple log
transformations may be inadequate for these data because of the method used to select them.
The data were selected for their extremity—punitive awards had to exceed $100 million to enter
the sample. Statistical methods appropriate for extreme values, see Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Analyzing Large Punitive Damages Awards (unpublished paper), and for the
Figure 3: Transformed brain weight versus body weight, mammals.
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inferring the absenceof a relationbetweenpunitive and compensatory awards
based in part on an inappropriate model.14 The assumptions of ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) are not satisfied.15 One should expect, as H-V
report, that a regression model of Figure 1’s data would not yield satisfactory
results. But the model’s poor results are not evidence of no relation or a weak
relation between punitive and compensatory awards. Rather, the results
suggest that an inappropriate model yields questionable results.
To better visualize the data, we transform them to base-10 logarithms
and examine a second scatterplot.
Figure 4 is more revealing than Figure 1. One can now differentiate
among the cases and the data reveal an upward-sloping relation, but with
several awards disconnected from the mass of awards. Figure 4 also labels
tobacco cases (as determined by case names with tobacco company defen-
dants; Engle is also a tobacco case) as well as the large Exxon Valdez case. At
least five tobacco cases are in the data—four are jury trials, one is a bench
trial—and they are distinguishable from the mass of large punitive cases. The
enormous stakes of the national tobacco settlement, as well as historical
tobacco industry behavior, suggest why tobacco cases might follow a distinc-
tive pattern.16 So, both knowledge of the social forces shaping tobacco
awards and exploratory data analysis counsel in favor of attempting to
account for any distinctive features of the tobacco cases.
B. Regression Models of the Data
Figure 5 shows the same data as Figure 4 but includes two linear regression
lines that best fit subsets of the data. The higher regression line is limited to
censoring implicit in the selection mechanism should probably be employed. See Section II.C.3,
infra. An additional approach would be to model the two groupings of data, as suggested by
Figure 5, using mixture-regression techniques. See D.M. Titterington, Statistical Analysis of
Finite Mixture Distributions (1986). For purposes of this presentation, we follow H-V and
explore OLS methods as applied to these data. The mixture-regression results are not substan-
tively different from the OLS approach in Models 2 to 5 in Table 2.
14Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 10.
15For example, a plot of residuals versus fitted values based on a regression using the untrans-
formed data shows an unacceptable pattern. E.g., Weisberg, supra note 11, at 36–37; Weisberg
(1980), supra note 12, at 120. See also note 26, infra.
16See Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing
Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1129 (2001).
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the five tobacco cases. The lower regression line includes the 58 other data
points. The lines are nearly parallel, suggesting that tobacco cases can rea-
sonably be accounted for by a dummy variable that shifts the regression
model intercept upward.17
Assuming that OLS is a reasonable approach,18 we, following H-V, limit
the sample to jury trials because the primary H-V claim is that jury trials
17When the sample is limited to jury trials, as we do for the rest of this article, a model that uses
an interaction term consisting of the product of a tobacco dummy variable times punitive
damages (log) yields results similar to those using a tobacco dummy variable instead of the
interaction term. In fact, the interaction term model is slightly superior to the dummy variable
model, with an adjusted r 2 of 0.52 compared to 0.49 in Model 2 in Table 2 and a slightly lower
Akaike information criteria. The key results for our purposes are (1) that accounting for
tobacco cases, whether through an interaction term or a dummy variable, yields models sub-
stantially more persuasive than models that fail to account for tobacco cases, and (2) that
reasonably accounting for tobacco cases shows a strong statistically significant association
between punitive and compensatory damages.
18See note 13, supra.
Figure 4: Punitive versus compensatory damages: punitive awards of at least
$100,000,000, 1985–2003.
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exhibit no significant relation between punitive and compensatory damages.
The dependent variable in Table 2’s Models 1 and 2 is the log of punitive
damages,19 and all models include a variable for “year” to pick up a possible
linear time trend. Other explanatory variables are compensatory damages
in Model 1 and compensatory damages and a tobacco dummy variable in
Models 2 to 5. Model 1 is most like the H-V log-based model,20 though we are
unable to precisely replicate their results. We accept, for purposes of discus-
19Using the log of punitive damages as a dependent variable in a normal-distribution-based
regression model is equivalent to assuming that the punitive damages follow a log normal
distribution. See Norman L. Johnson, Samuel Kotz & N. Balakrishan, Continuous Univariate
Distributions (2d ed. 1994).
20H-V do not report having used models that try to control for time.
Figure 5: Punitive versus compensatory damages: punitive awards of at least
$100,000,000, 1985–2003.
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sion, that Model 1, or the H-V log-based model,21 supports their claim of no
significant association between punitive and compensatory awards.
Nevertheless, Table 2 suggests that H-V erroneously concluded that no
substantial, statistically significant association exists between punitive and
compensatory damages. Model 2, which adds a single dummy variable for
tobacco cases, yields an adjusted r2 of nearly 0.5 and shows a highly signifi-
cant association between punitive and compensatory damages. The r 2 is
similar to the explanatory power of models of less extreme punitive damage
awards.22
C. Assessing Regression Models
Methodologically, however, it is premature to conclude the analysis. Just as
sound regression technique requires graphically examining the data, sound
technique also requires postestimation assessment of a model beyond the
reported significance levels and the amount of variance explained.
1. Examining Residual Plots and the Need for Additional Transformations
Plots of residuals versus other quantities are a standard tool for finding
failures of OLS assumptions.23 “The most common plot, especially useful in
simple regression, is the plot of residuals versus fitted values.”24 Examining a
studentized residuals versus fitted plot of Model 2, shown in Figure 6, sug-
gests that the pattern of residuals is not satisfactory. If the assumptions of
OLS are satisfied, the plot ideally should show a random pattern,25 but
Figure 5 suggests a pattern of residuals increasing with fitted values, an
indication of nonconstant residual variance (heteroskedasticity).26 A test for
heteroskedasticity suggests that one can reject the hypothesis of constant
variance (p  0.0001).
21Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 10.
22Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 1.
23Weisberg, supra note 11, at 36.
24Id.
25Id. at 36–37.
26A residuals versus fitted plot of Model 1 suggests both nonconstant variance and extreme
outliers.
Association Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases 185
T
ab
le
2:
B
lo
ck
bu
st
er
Pu
n
it
iv
e
A
w
ar
ds
as
a
Fu
n
ct
io
n
of
C
om
pe
n
sa
to
ry
A
w
ar
ds
1
2
3
4
5
D
ep
en
de
nt
Va
ri
ab
le
=
Pu
ni
tiv
es
(L
og
)
(M
os
t
L
ik
e
H
-V
M
od
el
)
Pu
ni
tiv
es
(L
og
)
Pu
ni
tiv
es
T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
to
M
in
im
iz
e
Sk
ew
ne
ss
Pu
ni
tiv
es
T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
,
E
n
gl
e
Ex
cl
ud
ed
Pu
ni
tiv
es
T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
,
E
n
gl
e
A
dj
us
te
d
N
o
T
ob
ac
co
Va
ri
ab
le
T
ob
ac
co
Va
ri
ab
le
In
cl
ud
ed
T
ob
ac
co
Va
ri
ab
le
In
cl
ud
ed
T
ob
ac
co
Va
ri
ab
le
In
cl
ud
ed
T
ob
ac
co
Va
ri
ab
le
In
cl
ud
ed
C
om
pe
n
sa
to
ry
da
m
ag
es
—
lo
g
0.
21
7*
(2
.2
1)
0.
37
5*
*
(4
.8
2)
1.
67
0*
*
(5
.2
0)
1.
49
6*
*
(5
.2
0)
1.
75
9*
*
(5
.1
2)
Ye
ar
0.
03
2*
(2
.0
3)
0.
01
3
(1
.0
5)
0.
06
2
(1
.1
8)
0.
06
2
(1
.2
9)
0.
06
1
(1
.1
1)
T
ob
ac
co
1.
77
6*
*
(3
.6
3)
5.
99
8*
*
(4
.7
6)
4.
94
0*
*
(3
.4
8)
6.
49
5*
*
(4
.5
2)
C
on
st
an
t
-5
7.
44
6+
(1
.8
3)
-1
9.
57
4
(0
.8
1)
-1
17
.2
29
(1
.1
2)
-1
16
.7
60
(1
.2
2)
-1
16
.8
63
(1
.0
6)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
60
60
60
59
60
A
dj
us
te
d
r2
0.
07
0.
49
0.
38
0.
32
0.
38
+S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
10
pe
rc
en
t;
*s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5
pe
rc
en
t;
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1
pe
rc
en
t;
ro
bu
st
t
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.
N
o
te
:
In
M
od
el
s
1
an
d
2,
pu
n
it
iv
e
da
m
ag
es
ar
e
tr
an
sf
or
m
ed
to
lo
g
(1
0)
.
In
M
od
el
s
3
to
5,
pu
n
it
iv
e
da
m
ag
es
ar
e
tr
an
sf
or
m
ed
to
m
in
im
iz
e
sk
ew
n
es
s
us
in
g
ln
(p
un
it
iv
es
-k
),
w
h
er
e
k
is
th
e
sh
if
t
pa
ra
m
et
er
.T
h
is
h
el
ps
ac
co
un
t
fo
r
th
e
$1
00
m
ill
io
n
(1
08
)
fl
oo
r
H
-V
ch
os
e
fo
r
in
cl
us
io
n
of
ca
se
s
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e.
k
va
ri
es
sl
ig
h
tl
y
de
pe
n
di
n
g
on
th
e
m
ak
eu
p
of
th
e
sa
m
pl
e.
M
od
el
s
3
to
5
va
ry
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
of
En
gl
e,
a
Fl
or
id
a
to
ba
cc
o
ca
se
w
it
h
a
pu
n
it
iv
e
aw
ar
d
of
$1
45
bi
lli
on
.S
ee
Se
ct
io
n
II
.C
fo
r
di
sc
us
si
on
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
of
En
gl
e.
T
h
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
of
En
gl
e
va
ri
es
th
e
m
ak
eu
p
of
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
us
ed
to
es
ti
m
at
e
k.
Fo
r
M
od
el
3,
k
=
9.
92
¥
10
7 ;
fo
r
M
od
el
4,
k
=
9.
81
¥
10
7 ;
fo
r
M
od
el
5,
k
=
9.
95
¥
10
7 .
D
at
a
co
n
si
st
of
60
ju
ry
-tr
ie
d
ca
se
s
w
it
h
pu
n
it
iv
e
aw
ar
ds
of
$1
00
m
ill
io
n
or
m
or
e,
fr
om
19
85
–2
00
3,
as
re
po
rt
ed
in
H
er
sc
h
an
d
V
is
cu
si
,J
ou
rn
al
of
L
eg
al
St
ud
ie
s
20
04
.
186 Eisenberg and Wells
To help address the limitations of the models discussed so far, we
employ a skewness-minimizing transformation of the dependent variable, a
more refined transformation than the simple log transformation. It is based
on a one-parameter shifted log transformation, where the shift minimizes
the skewness of the dependent variable. In this case, the optimal shift param-
eter was identified using the “lnskew0” function in Stata version 9.1. The
resulting shift parameter, 9.92 ¥ 107 for Model 3, is a small amount less than
the punitive damages floor selected by H-V, which equals 108. The trans-
formed dependent variable is thus log(punitives -9.92 ¥ 107). It shifts the
dependent variable’s distribution to accommodate the arbitrary floor of
$100 million (108) in punitive damages used as the data selection criteria.
Since this transformation has this interpretable link to the data, we use it
instead of another familiar one-parameter transformation, for example, the
Box-Cox transformation. Since the shift parameter, 9.92 ¥ 107, is slightly
Figure 6: Studentized residuals versus fitted plot,
dependent variable = log punitives.
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smaller than the censoring level imposed on the data, the transformed
variable leaves a small left-tail for the floor values of punitive damages in the
data.27
Model 3 in Table 2 employs the skewness-minimized dependent vari-
able. It shows an even more statistically significant relation between the two
key explanatory variables, tobacco and compensatory damages (log), and the
dependent variable. However, Model 3 also explains less of the variance than
Model 2, with an adjusted r 2 of 0.38 compared to 0.49 in Model 2. So the
significant relation between punitive and compensatory damages persists but
the model does not explain as much of the variance.
Postestimation analysis confirms that Model 3 has desirable properties
compared to Model 2. Figure 7 is a studentized residuals versus fitted plot for
Model 3. The scatterplot shows a more random pattern than Figure 6. The
plot suggests that Model 3 better satisfies OLS assumptions than Models 1 or
2. A test for the presence of heteroskedasticity indicates that one cannot
reject the hypothesis of constant variance (p = 0.266). Other OLS assump-
tions are reasonably well satisfied28 but we are primarily interested in the
relative merits of the reported models, not the absolute propriety of the
models. The unbalanced nature of the sample—the relatively few tobacco
cases—suggests using bootstrap methods29 to assess the robustness of the
model. Such methods yield essentially the same results as those reported
here. Both visually and statistically, Model 3 should be preferred over Models
1 and 2 if one is attendant to the OLS assumptions.
It is also instructive to compare how the most reasonable H-V-like
model (because it transforms the data to logs), Model 1 in Table 2, compares
27Furthermore, the transfer parameter is selected so that the lower-end increments and upper-
end increments are symmetric about the mean transformed value and have a range of six
standard deviations.
28The standard OLS assumptions of the appropriateness of a linear relation (see Figure 8, top
figure) and constant variance are addressed in the text. In addition, there is no correlation
between the explanatory variables and the residuals, and multicollinearity, see Weisberg, supra
note 11, at 214–16, as measured by variance inflation factors, is not a problem. Assumptions
about the normality of the residuals appear reasonably satisfied in Model 3. A Shapiro-Wilk test
for normality yields p = 0.121. The assumption of the absence of serial correlation, for example,
Weisberg, supra note 11, at 226 (noting that, in time series, use of lagged dependent variables
can help account for serial correlations between consecutive measurements), is not seriously at
issue here.
29Bradley Efron & Robert J. Tibshirani, An Introduction to the Bootstrap (1993).
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in fitting the data with Table 2’s Model 3. Figure 8 shows, as small circles, the
fitted values of the regression models.
Figure 8’s bottom figure shows graphically how poorly the H-V model
fits the tobacco cases. The predicted values nowhere come close to the
observed values. Model 3, on the other hand, shown in the top figure,
captures reasonably well the central tendencies in both the tobacco cases’
awards and in the mass of awards. It is not surprising that Model 1 has such
low explanatory power. It is poorly specified to fit these data.
2. Alternative Treatments of Engle
Further refinement is possible. Figure 4 shows at least one possible outlier
case, the case with the highest punitive award, a punitive award of more than
11 in the log-10 scale, corresponding to a punitive award of more than $100
billion. It is not just that this case involves a high punitive award; as striking
is that the $100 billion punitive award is in a case with a compensatory award
Figure 7: Studentized residuals versus fitted plot, dependent variable = log
punitives, skewness minimized.
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Figure 8: Comparison of fit of models: Eisenberg-Wells (top) and Heisch-
Viscusi (bottom).
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indicate fitted values based on Table 2’s regression models, xs indicate observed values. Lines
are best-fitting lines for the tobacco cases (tobacco dummy variable = 1) and nontobacco cases
(tobacco variable = 0) in the top figure and for all cases combined in the bottom figure. The
bottom figure shows that the H-V model poorly fits the tobacco cases and other large awards.
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of much less than $100 million. The punitive-compensatory ratio is stagger-
ingly high, over 1,000 to 1.
Statistical techniques exist that deal with outliers in data, but the
soundest initial advice with respect to outliers is to check one’s data.30
Returning to the H-V data reveals that the suspect case is the famous Florida
tobacco case, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,31 in which a jury awarded
plaintiffs $145 billion against the tobacco industry. The award was on behalf
of a plaintiff class and the $145 billion figure in the H-V data is correct.
But the Engle award was struck on appeal and deeper analysis of the
case’s numbers suggest that including the trial-level award in the analysis, or
including it without modification, is questionable. The compensatory award
figure H-V use for Engle in the model in which they include that case is not
defensible. The Florida class of plaintiffs is estimated at up to 500,000
persons.32 The jury had already awarded about $12 million in compensatory
damages to four representative plaintiffs.33 If all 500,000 persons in the
punitive class suffered $1 million in harm, the compensatory award, based
solely on harm, would be $500 billion. A punitive award of $145 billion is of
the same order of magnitude and less than $1 of punitive damages per dollar
of compensatory award. So if class action certification was correct, a question
not for the jury, and the compensatory awards were representative of the
class harm, the $145 billion punitive award should be not be associated with
the $12 million used by H-V to measure the compensatory award. Rather, it
30For example, A.A. Afifi & Virginia Clark, Computer-Aided Multivariate Analysis 43 (1984)
(recommending that outliers be checked against the original data for error).
31Engle et al. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al., No. 94-8273 CA 22 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 11th Jud. Dist.,
Dade Cty. Nov. 6, 2000) (approving $145 billion dollar award), rev’d, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. App.
2003), review granted, 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004). For discussion of the tobacco verdict, see Marc
Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: $145 Billion; Fla. Jury Hands Industry Major Setback, Wash.
Post, July 15, 2000, at A01.
32Tobacco Companies Ordered to Pay $145 Billion in Punitive Damages, 15 Andrews Tobacco
Ind. Litig. Rep. 3 (2000). For reports that the class might be 700,000 persons, see Marianne
Lavelle & Angie Cannon, Chewing Big Tobacco: Will the $145 Billion Verdict Stand?, U.S. News
& World Rep. July 24 (2000); Richard Hubbard, Closing Arguments Near Completion in Fla.
Tobacco Trial, Dow Jones News Serv. July 12 (2000); Myron Levin, Jury Asked to Hit Cigarette
Firms for $154 Billion Tobacco: Lawyer in Florida Class Action Says Record-Shattering Verdict
Would Be “Just” Punishment for Harm, L.A. Times July 11 (2000), 2000 WL 2259395.
33Tobacco Companies Ordered to Pay $145 Billion in Punitive Damages, 15 Andrews Tobacco
Ind. Litig. Rep. 3 (2000). However, one of those awards was questionable in light of a statute of
limitations problem. Id.
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should be associated with an unknowable number, but the correct number
likely exceeds $500 billion. Including Engle without modification associates
the compensatory harm for four persons with punitive damages awarded to
hundreds of thousands of putative victims. H-V do report a model that
deletes Engle,34 a reasonable decision. However, including Engle in another
model without modification, and claiming that the model is a poor one, is
not justifiable.
Model 4 in Table 2 omits Engle, and Model 5 includes it with an
adjustment as described above. Models 3, 4, and 5 present a reasonably
consistent statistical story. We conclude that, subject to the limits of using
OLS on these data, a strong, statistically significant association exists between
punitive and compensatory awards, even in the extreme set of awards
assembled by H-V. Additional models, not reported here, establish that the
association does not depend on the tobacco cases. Even excluding those
cases, a highly statistically significant association exists between punitive and
compensatory awards in jury cases in the H-V sample (p  0.001).
3. Additional Measures to Deal with Limiting the Sample to Cases with $100
Million Awards
As noted above, the H-V data have the distinctive feature of being limited to
cases with punitive awards of $100 million or more. Although the log trans-
formation with shift parameter reported as Model 3 in Table 2 gives reason-
ably satisfactory OLS results, it is helpful to explore the distribution of the
transformed variable. Figure 9 shows the distribution of punitive awards, as
transformed. Figure 9 shows a reasonably normal-looking distribution for
much of its range, but with a distinctive peak in the left tail of the distribu-
tion. This peak results from the fact the H-V data contain eight observations
at their low-end censoring point, $100 million. Although the shift-parameter-
based log transformation helps account for the location of the distribution,
it does not expressly account for the distribution’s distinctive shape.
We explore two approaches to expressly address the shape of the
distribution. First, the $100 million censoring point is obviously arbitrary.
Suppose the H-V data were limited to cases that exceed $100 million in
punitive damages rather than to cases that equaled or exceeded $100
34The model in which H-V exclude Engle also seemingly fails to account for the distinctive
pattern of tobacco awards. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 10.
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million. Would that materially change the models? Second, the censoring at
the low end of the sample suggests exploring tobit models with censoring at
$100 million.
Table 3 reports results for these models. Table 3’s first model omits the
eight cases with punitive awards of $100 million, and uses a shifted log
transformation that reflects the modified distribution of the dependent
variable. Table 3’s second model accounts for the data selection by using a
tobit model. Both models are analogous to Model 3 in Table 2. The model
that omits the eight cases again shows a strong, significant association
between punitive and compensatory damages and again indicates the impor-
tance of accounting for the tobacco cases. The tobit model suggests an even
Figure 9: Distribution of transformed punitive damages.
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Note: The figure is a kernel density estimate of the distribution of the transformed dependent
variable used in Model 3 of Table 2. Punitive damages are transformed to minimize skewness
using ln(punitives -k), where k is the shift parameter, k = 9.92 ¥ 107. Data consist of 60 jury-tried
cases with punitive awards of $100 million or more, from 1985–2003, as reported in Hersch and
Viscusi, Journal of Legal Studies 2004.
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stronger association between compensatory damages and punitive damages
(coefficient = 1.798 compared to 1.670 in Table 2, Model 3) and between
tobacco and punitive damages (coefficient = 6.307 compared to 5.998 in
Table 2, Model 3).
III. Conclusion
A more statistically sound OLS approach undermines the claim that for “the
blockbuster award sample, the value of the compensatory award is not a
significant predictor of the value of punitive damages.”35 Blockbuster puni-
tive awards, like other punitive awards, show a strong association with com-
pensatory awards. The statistical lessons are that one should graph one’s data
and check that the assumptions of OLS regression are satisfied before
endorsing a model. We emphasize that we are not certain that traditional
OLS techniques are necessarily the ones to employ for these extreme data
and that models of the full range of cases might require introducing some
35Id.
Table 3: Regression Models Addressing Limiting the Sample to Cases with
Punitive Awards of $100 Million or More
1 2
Drop Cases with Punitives
Equal to $100 Million
Tobit Model
with Left-Censoring
Compensatory damages—log 1.325** (4.05) 1.798** (4.76)
Tobacco 4.914** (3.82) 6.307** (4.81)
Year 0.091 (1.67) 0.061 (0.81)
Constant -173.037 (1.57) -116.329 (0.77)
Observations 52 60
Adjusted r 2 (1); pseudo r 2 (2) 0.38 0.10
Robust t statistics in parentheses; +significant at 10 percent; *significant at 5 percent; **signifi-
cant at 1 percent.
Note: Punitive damages, the dependent variable, is transformed to minimize skewness using
ln(punitives -k), where k is the shift parameter. k varies slightly depending on the makeup of
the sample. For Model 1, k = 1.01 ¥ 108; for Model 2, k is the same as in Model 3 of Table 2,
9.92 ¥ 107. Data for Model 1 consist of 52 jury-tried cases with punitive damages greater than
$100 million. Data for Model 2 consist of 60 jury-tried cases with punitive awards of $100 million
or more. Model 2 is a tobit model with eight left-censored observations. Data for both models
cover the years 1985–2003, as reported in Hersch and Viscusi, Journal of Legal Studies 2004.
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curvature into the punitive-compensatory relation.36 But H-V, like many
researchers, understandably resort to OLS as a kind of default statistical
methodology. That methodology should be employed more rigorously than
is done in the H-V article.
36Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a New Capping System,
and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 387, 391–92.
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